Anchoring Effect
Anchoring Effect
What is the anchoring effect?
- The first number becomes the reference point for judgment
- Why making the first offer in a negotiation pays off
- Defend with preset benchmarks and a counteroffer
Understanding anchoring means that in negotiation, 'who puts a number on the table first' is not a matter of taste but a tactical decision. Even with the same product, the same cost, and the same people at the table, the final contract value can swing by tens of millions of won depending on which number lands on the table first. That’s why everything in practice becomes part of the design: the order of items in a quotation, the budget line in an RFP, and even an offhand remark at kickoff like "A project this size usually runs around this much."
An anchor’s power comes less from the number itself than from its 'precision' and 'rationale'. KRW 98.4 million (≈ US$73,600) makes a stronger anchor than KRW 100 million (≈ US$74,800): a rounded number reads as a 'rough guess' and invites large adjustments, while a precise figure signals that there is a calculation behind it, which narrows the range of adjustment. The conditions that weaken an anchor are just as clear. The effect shrinks noticeably when the other side has documented its reservation price and market rates in advance, or when three or more competing quotes are on the table. Also keep it distinct from the framing effect. Framing is about whether the same fact is described as a loss or a gain; anchoring is about where you set the starting point of the judgment.
The most common misconception in the field is "Whoever names a number first, and aggressively, wins." When you have less information, going first can actually box you in. If the customer’s budget is KRW 300 million (≈ US$224,500) and sales opens at KRW 150 (≈ US$1) million, your ceiling is fixed at KRW 150 million (≈ US$112,200) the moment you say it. Throwing out two or three times the market rate with no justification is risky too: instead of negotiating down, the other side may walk away and go to a competitor. Buyers make the mirror-image mistake. Putting a budget cap in the RFP up front seems like it would save money, but in practice every proposal comes in right at that cap, and what gets cut is not the price but the implementation scope and maintenance staffing. Knowing about the bias doesn’t make you immune either. A 'fair price' calculated after hearing the other side’s number is already contaminated, so writing down your target and walk-away prices on paper before the negotiation is effectively the only defense.
John KimAuthor of B2B Marketing Design and CEO of Nanum Consulting
Jaehyuk ParkHands-on instructor in B2B technical sales and AI-driven sales strategyAmos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman established it as the 'anchoring and adjustment' heuristic in their 1974 Science paper, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” It became widely known through Kahneman’s book Thinking, Fast and Slow.
Consider a hypothetical case. Company A, an industrial parts maker (450 employees, annual revenue of about KRW 120 billion (≈ US$89,780,000)), had used Company B’s quality-management solution for three years at KRW 180 million (≈ US$134,700) a year. Two months before renewal, Company A’s purchasing manager spoke first and laid down a marker: "Our IT budget was cut by 30% this year. You’ll need to come in under KRW 120 million (≈ US$89,800) for us to even consider it." For Company B’s sales rep, the negotiation began with the other side’s anchor already dropped.
- Company B’s sales rep didn’t discuss numbers on the spot. Saying, "Let’s look at the last three years of results before we talk price," they booked the next meeting. Internally, they wrote down a target price of KRW 170 million (≈ US$127,200) and a walk-away price of KRW 152 million (≈ US$113,700) and got the team lead’s sign-off.
- At the meeting two weeks later, the sales rep opened with figures compiled together with Company A’s quality team: after adoption, the process defect rate fell from 2.1% to 0.9%, and annual claim-handling costs dropped by KRW 43 million (≈ US$32,200). The rep then moved the reference point: "The value this solution creates is KRW 43 million (≈ US$32,200) a year."
- Only then did the sales rep present the renewal quote. Instead of a flat KRW 180 (≈ US$1) million, the quote read KRW 176.4 (≈ US$1) million, broken down by unit price per module, with a rationale for every line: "License KRW 112 (≈ US$1) million, maintenance KRW 41.8 (≈ US$1) million, on-site training KRW 22.6 million (≈ US$16,900)."
- When Company A’s purchasing manager held firm, saying, "KRW 130 million (≈ US$97,300) is still our internal limit," the sales rep didn’t chip downward from that number. Instead: "At KRW 130 (≈ US$1) million, we’d have to drop training and on-site support staff, and then we couldn’t respond the way we did during last year’s line expansion." The rep turned the conversation from price back to scope.
- They finally agreed on KRW 168 million (≈ US$125,700) a year in exchange for a 3-year contract. That was 40% higher than the KRW 120 million (≈ US$89,800) the purchasing team first put on the table and 93% of the existing contract price, and Company B locked in KRW 504 million (≈ US$377,100) in three-year revenue at once.